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Keeping the Account Open: 
On Metaphysical Mistrust in Transpersonal Psychology
(A Response to Hartelius, 2017)
Keywords: perennialism, essentialism, metaphysics, science
In response to Hartelius (2017), I suggest that the evidence for perennialism or essentialism can 
be tested, and is publicly accessible, through engagement with the spiritual practices that have 
given rise to cross-cultural mystical experiences with common characteristics. This suggests that 
essentialism could be included in transpersonal psychology (and psychology in general). I suggest 
that there is no reason why transpersonal psychology should exclude metaphysical claims, as long 
as they are inferred or implied by research and evidence, explicitly stated and viewed as secondary. 
It is impossible to avoid metaphysics, and it is important for transpersonal psychologists (and all 
psychologists and scientists in general) to be explicit about their metaphysical assumptions.  
I am grateful for the extensive response Hartelius (2017) has made to my essay, “The Return of Perennial Perspectives? Why Transpersonal Psychology Should 
Remain Open to Essentialism” (Taylor, 2017a). This 
ongoing dialogue has stimulated me to further develop 
and clarify my ideas and to conduct further research in 
these areas. 
 In this response, I further defend the view 
that there is no reason why transpersonal psychologists 
should refrain from stating metaphysical positions, so 
long as these are secondary, and are inferred or implied 
by phenomenological evidence and with more research 
proposed to test a hypothesis. It is artificial to attempt to 
refrain from making metaphysical claims, and important 
not to conceive of science as an objective, non-metaphysical 
domain that only includes phenomena or concepts that can 
be falsified. 
 In any case, it may not be valid to assume that 
the evidence for perennialism or essentialism cannot be 
tested, and is not publicly accessible. It can be tested, and 
is accessible to investigation, through engagement with 
the spiritual practices that have given rise to cross-cultural 
mystical experiences with common characteristics. It may 
therefore be unreasonable to exclude essentialism from 
transpersonal psychology (and psychology in general). 
In these terms, perennialism does not necessarily lie 
outside science and psychology, and soft perennialism 
should not be seen as a New Age religion (as Hartelius 
has suggested). 
 One of the traditional aims of transpersonal 
psychology is to explore the farther reaches of human 
nature, expansive areas of potential human experience that 
are obscure, and may be difficult to frame linguistically or 
conceptually (such as mystical experiences in which one 
experiences a sense of oneness with the world). To view 
these areas as metaphysical and attempt to exclude them 
is possibly therefore contrary to the historical principles 
of the field. In this response, I will also describe why I 
disagree with Hartelius’ comparison of soft perennialism 
to creationism and intelligent design.
The Perennial Perspective
The main aim of Taylor (2017a) was to make a strong defense of the perennial perspective. A case was 
made that there is ample evidence for a common core 
of essential characteristics of awakening experiences (as 
explorations and interpretations of the same expansive 
landscape of potential human experience). As a result, 
it was argued that an experiential perennialist (or 
essentialist) outlook is valid and necessary. At the same 
time it was shown that other potential arguments to 
account for these commonalities—such as cultural 
transmission and neurology—are weak. 
 Hartelius (2017) has remarked that “Whether 
or not a handful of contemporary academics support 
perennialist or essentialist positions does not make 
soft perennialism more critically sound” (p. 104). 
However, there is a little more to it than this. For 
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 example, as suggested in Taylor (2017a), some of the 
most convincing evidence of a perennial experiential 
landscape comes from cross-cultural studies using 
Hood’s quantitative measure, the M-Scale. These studies 
have shown that the same characteristics occur across 
different traditions, as well as outside those traditions. 
In addition, academics such as Studstill (2005) and 
Rose (2016) have made extremely detailed comparative 
investigations of contemplative traditions, which may 
not be easily refuted. It is also important to remember 
that these scholars’ arguments in favor of perennialism 
is just one aspect of the overall case. For example, in 
my previous response, evidence was presented from 
near-death experiences, reports of post-traumatic 
growth (or post-traumatic transformation) and from 
individuals who were naturally awakened without being 
familiar with spiritual traditions. Arguments against the 
contextualist theory of mystical experiences were also 
put forward.
 I appreciate it may not be possible for Hartelius 
to respond to every point I made in my previous response, 
but let me repeat my argument that previous critiques of 
perennialism (Hartelius & Ferrer, 2013; Hartelius, 2015) 
largely only dealt with a straw man of traditional hard 
perennialism, without looking at some more nuanced 
theories from contemporary scholars. Hartelius again 
argues that it is problematic that spiritual traditions 
describe non-ordinary experiences inconsistently, but 
his discussion of spiritual diversity needs to account 
for two different issues. First, there is the distinction 
between popular religion and the contemplative 
traditions that may be associated with them, such as 
between popular Christianity and Christian mysticism, 
between conventional Islam and Sufism, or between 
popular Hinduism and Yoga or Vedanta. Schuon 
(1984) framed this as a distinction between exoteric and 
esoteric traditions. Wilber (2000) has made a similar 
distinction between conventional translative religion 
and transformative contemplative traditions. In Taylor 
(2017b) the same distinction has been described in terms 
of conventional religion which consoles and compensates 
the ego, and mystical traditions that encourage one to 
transcend the ego. Obviously, these distinctions are 
not cut and dried, but it is important to take them 
into account, since scholars of religion generally agree 
that the greatest diversity is found within exoteric 
or conventional religions, whereas the contemplative 
traditions have much greater commonalities. 
 The second issue that is relevant to Hartelius' 
discussion of spirituality diversity is that—as pointed 
out in Taylor (2017a)—diversity is much reduced in 
phenomenological descriptions of mystical experience 
(particularly those that occur outside the context specific 
spiritual traditions) compared to teachings or conceptual 
frameworks (Marshall, 2005). Scholars such as Forman 
(1999) and Marshall (2005) have suggested that Katz 
(1978) has made the error of comparing teachings 
rather than actual accounts of mystical experiences. 
Narratives and beliefs may be significantly diverse; and 
the experiences and practices associated with popular or 
exoteric religion may be diverse; but there is significantly 
more commonality in the experiences and practices 
associated with contemplative traditions. 
Explanations and Correlations
In Taylor (2017a) I described the attempt to account for mystical experiences in neurological factors as a form 
of neuroscientific reductionism. Three problematic areas 
were highlighted: the hard problem of explaining any 
conscious experience in terms of neurological factors, 
the lack of direct and reliable correspondence between 
mental and neural activity, and anomalous experiences 
such as NDEs and terminal lucidity, which suggest 
that consciousness is to some degree independent of the 
brain. Hartelius (2017a) has responded to this with an 
argument in favor of correlations between mental events 
and neural activity, stating that my approach involves 
“rejecting suggestions that the shared biological heritage 
of the human family might be in any way correlated 
with similarities in what he has identified as awakening 
experiences across a variety of religious and secular 
contexts; his concern is that these might constitute 
neuroscientific reductionism” (p. 102).
 However, in Taylor (2017a) I did not argue 
against a correlation but against an explanation. In 
this context, correlations do not denote neuroscientific 
reductionism, but explanations do. It is true that I have 
suggested, in a more general sense, that “neuroscience 
has yet to establish any reliable and consistent 
correspondence between specific mental states and 
specific patterns of neurological activity, which we would 
expect if the latter produced the former” (Taylor, 2017a, 
p. 80). But a reliable and consistent correspondence is 
a different matter from a correlation. It seems perfectly 
logical to assume that there may be associations 
between awakening experiences and certain patterns 
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 113Metaphysical Mistrust and Ideology in Transpersonal
of neurological activity, and with certain physiological 
changes, but this is not to say that they are reliable or 
consistent, or generalizable. I do not reject the possibility 
of neurological correlations. I simply argue that—at least 
as yet—there is no evidence of causation.
 In Hartelius (2017a) some examples of 
correlations between states of consciousness and 
neurology and physiology have been provided, to justify 
the argument that “a neurobiological theory greatly 
reduces any urgent need for explanation by some form of 
perennialism, and is considerably more parsimonious” (p. 
102). However, the neurological theories that have been 
put forward so far (such as Persinger, 1983, or Newberg 
& D’Aquilli, 2000) have proven woefully inadequate 
(Marshall, 2005; Kelly & Grosso, 2007; Aaen-Stockdale, 
2012). It is possible that a much more satisfactory theory 
may emerge in the future, but these previous efforts do 
not inspire confidence. Any such theory would also have 
to surmount the “hard problem.”
 Hartelius (2017a) has gone to great lengths to 
defend reductionism in general, stating that “the mere 
fact that a process involves some reduction should not 
make it immediately suspect” (p. 102). I completely agree 
with this. Reductionism is often useful, and sometimes 
necessary, such as when, in Hartelius' (2017a) words, 
“explanatory reduction enables complex information to 
be grasped in terms of salient features; even language 
entails reducing many unique phenomena to a single 
category such as dog or door” (p. 102). However, my 
argument was not against reductionism in general, only 
against neuroscientific reductionism. The argument is 
only that reductionism has not proven up to the task of 
explaining spiritual or mystical experiences.
Metaphysical Mistrust
Hartelius’ (2017a) position is that “perennialism is a metaphysical philosophy of spirituality whereas 
psychology is an empirical study of the human mind 
and its expression” (p. 79). In other words, perennialism 
has no place in psychology. However, simply deeming 
perennialism to be metaphysical does not invalidate 
it. If the evidence for it is convincing, and cannot be 
adequately refuted, then it should be included within 
the parameters of psychology, rather than excluded on 
ideological grounds. 
 One could compare this to how a scientist might 
react to evidence for psychic phenomena. Imagine a 
tightly controlled, methodologically sound experiment 
that shows a statistically significant effect for telepathy 
or precognition. Ideally, a scientist would carefully 
review the study, and if he or she deemed it convincing, 
cautiously accept that there appears to be evidence of 
an unexplained phenomenon. However, past examples 
indicate that this ideal scenario does not often occur. 
For example, in (2011) Bem published a paper called 
“Feeling the Future” in the Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, detailing the results of 9 experiments 
involving more than 1000 participants, eight of which 
showed significant statistical evidence for precognition 
and premonition. However, prominent skeptics were 
outraged, and dismissed Bem’s findings out of hand. For 
example, Hyman described the results, as"pure craziness 
... an embarrassment for the entire field” (in Carr, 2011, 
p. 2). In other words, skeptics were unwilling to consider 
the evidence on ideological grounds.
 In some respects, Hartelius' position is quite 
simple and logical: science does not deal with metaphysics; 
transpersonal psychology should strive to be a science, 
and therefore should be free of metaphysics. In his view, 
soft perennialism is a metaphysical claim and should 
not therefore be presented as a psychological theory. The 
subtitle of my recent book (The Psychology of Spiritual 
Awakening [Taylor, 2017b]) is therefore misleading, 
since it does not actually discuss psychology (although 
note that the soft perennialist model is not presented in 
this book, nor in any other of my popular books. Indeed, 
I have not discussed transpersonal psychology directly in 
any of my books.) 
 However, the relationship between metaphysics 
and science may be more complicated and nuanced 
than this. Science and metaphysics (and by association 
religion) are not discrete and independent areas. 
Hartelius has an intense faith in the (relative) objectivity 
and reliability of science and a correspondingly jaundiced 
attitude to metaphysics. In his view, soft perennialism 
fits neatly into the category of metaphysics, whereas 
psychology (and the kind of transpersonal psychology 
advocated by Hartelius) fits into the category of science. 
 First of all, one may consider the contention 
that perennialism lies outside science and psychology, 
and therefore belongs to the category of religion. I agree 
with Hartelius' (2017) statement that psychological 
ideas should not be “metaphysical in the sense that 
they appeal to causes on the basis of authority or 
tradition rather than evidence of the sort anyone 
could examine for themselves if they took the trouble 
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to do so. Explanations based on causes for which 
there likely can be no direct evidence are more typical 
of religious knowledge” (p. 93). However, I do not 
believe that this applies to soft perennialism. I think 
that it is possible to find direct evidence—or public 
evidence—for essentialism.  For example, consider the 
case that has been made for essential aspects of mystical 
experience by scholars such as Studstill (2005) and 
Rose (2016), and the evidence for these accumulated 
by cross-cultural studies using Hood’s M-scale. This 
is evidence that certainly can be examined by anyone 
who is prepared to follow the transformative practices 
and processes discussed by Studstill (2005; specifically, 
those of Dzogchen and medieval German mystics such 
as Meister Eckhart, Suso and Tauler) or by Rose (2016; 
specifically, those of Theravada Buddhism, Patañjalian 
Yoga, and Catholic mystical theology). In the same way, 
anyone is free to “test” the evidence of the cross-cultural 
studies of the M-Scale by engaging with diverse spiritual 
practices, and ascertaining whether they develop the 
characteristics highlighted by the scale. 
 In this sense, the evidence for essentialism can 
be examined. Therefore, in accordance with Hartelius' 
own definition, it is not a metaphysical claim. One 
certainly does not just have to accept essentialism 
based on tradition and authority, as Hartelius (2017) 
has suggested. That may be true of some facets of 
conventional or exoteric religion, but not in relation 
to contemplative traditions that emphasize direct, 
first-hand experience and verification for oneself. This 
form of phenomenological perennialism does therefore 
belong within the remit of psychology. In consequence, 
it is not a New Age religion.
 An argument against the above point might 
be that the common core of mystical experiences—
or what I have described as a landscape of expansive 
potential human experience (Taylor, 2016, 2017)—is 
not immediately and directly available to everyone. This 
is probably true, but to dismiss the common core theory 
on these grounds would be illogical, like deciding that 
there is no evidence for a landscape’s existence because 
only a small proportion of the population have travelled 
there and explored it. It is also an attitude that privileges 
ordinary consciousness (a state in which human beings 
do not generally have ready access to the common 
core characteristics) over other modes. Traditionally, 
transpersonal and spiritual attitudes have held that 
everyday awareness is limited to some degree, and that 
certain practices and paths allow cultivation of a more 
expansive awareness, opening one up to wider and 
deeper realities. So to disregard these wider and deeper 
realities because they are not immediately accessible 
could be construed as contravening the traditional 
principles of transpersonal psychology, and of spiritual 
traditions in general.
 Since the landscape of expansive potential 
human experience is accessible—even if not readily 
so—and so can be directly experienced, it does 
potentially conform to James’s (1904) concept of 
radical empiricism. If it is metaphysical in the sense 
Hartelius (2017) has used the term (in the sense of not 
being immediately and directly accessible) this is only 
in relation to ordinary consciousness—the ordinary 
consciousness that, according to the principles of 
spiritual traditions, is limited, and should be expanded 
and intensified. 
 On a more general point, I believe that 
Hartelius (2017) has too readily associated metaphysical 
claims with religion. Because I have made metaphysical 
claims (Taylor, 2017) he has accused me of propagating 
a New Age religion. But while religion certainly does 
include metaphysical claims, religion and metaphysics 
are not synonymous. One does not become religious as 
soon as one makes a metaphysical claim. In practice, 
metaphysical claims are often made outside the domain 
of religion—as will presently become clear, when 
the relationship between science and metaphysics is 
discussed. (As noted above, the fact that perennialism 
can be placed within the remit of psychology also 
suggests that it is not a New Age religion.) 
 Soft perennialism is a provocative theory 
suggested by a range of evidence from various sources, 
including mystical texts, anthropological reports of 
indigenous cultures, and reports of spiritual experiences 
or other transformative experiences. It is not a wholly 
abstract or conceptual (or religious) metaphysical claim, 
but one that I believe is to some extent empirical. Note 
that I use the term suggested rather than proven. I agree 
that the theory is speculative. But I think there is a 
valid case to be made for it, which merits serious debate. 
And the best way of refuting soft perennialism is not 
to dismiss it as metaphysical, but to engage with the 
evidence, and examine whether it supports the claim. 
If there was a good case for refuting my interpretation 
of the evidence then I would, of course, be willing to 
revise my views. 
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Science and Metaphysics
Hartelius (2017) has restated that concepts can be deemed metaphysical (and hence in his view 
nonscientific) if they “cannot be independently verified 
or falsified” (p. 99). However, this ignores the issue of 
whether it is invalid and outmoded to use falsification 
and verification as criteria to distinguish between science 
and metaphysics (Taylor, 2017a). Most contemporary 
philosophers of science recognize that it is “far too 
simplistic to make a distinction between falsifiable 
science and unfalsifiable metaphysics” (Taylor, 2017a, p. 
83). Most theories gain credence through accumulating 
evidence over a long period of time—that is, through 
confirmation rather than falsification (Kelly, 2015; 
Chalmers, 1979). If one thinks in terms of confirmation 
rather than falsification, and in terms of the importance 
of accumulating evidence, one could envisage how 
psychic phenomena such as telepathy or precognition 
could eventually be deemed scientifically valid, by way 
of successful trials and replicated results. The same could 
be true of perennialism, or essentialism. If sufficient 
evidence is deemed to have been accumulated via studies 
such as those using Hood’s M-Scale and other forms of 
quantitative and qualitative research, there is no reason 
why the concept should not be seen as scientifically valid.
 The issue here is testing. It must be seen if, over 
time, the evidence supports soft perennialism or does not. 
It is surely good scientific practice to allow a hypothesis 
the opportunity to establish itself. Again, note that I am 
not promoting soft perennialism as a proven psychological 
theory, only as a hypothesis which can be further 
investigated. 
 The same is true of the claim of an all-
pervading spiritual force. Even this—which I admit is 
a metaphysical step beyond essentialism itself, and even 
more of a speculation, but one that is still suggested by 
some evidence—could become a scientifically acceptable 
concept if it were supported by enough evidence. At 
any rate, the claim could be refined by more detailed 
investigation of the data—or alternatively, become refuted 
if a good case were made against it. 
 I suspect that part of the issue here may be my use 
of the term “spiritual force.” It may be that if I had used 
a more neutral term such as “consciousness” (Chalmers, 
1996) or  “field of awareness” (Forman, 1998, p. 185) then 
this claim would not have been deemed so controversial 
by Hartelius. (Indeed, as will be seen shortly, Hartelius, 
2015, has himself made a very similar  claim while using 
the term consciousness.)
 Another relevant issue here is the metaphysical 
basis of science. While in Taylor (2017a) it was argued that 
science may be strongly underpinned by metaphysical 
concepts, Hartelius (2017) has argued that there is 
a question of degree here, and that the metaphysical 
underpinnings of science are likely to be much less 
significant than those of religion. He has spoken of “the 
unavoidable presence of some metaphysical assumptions” 
but has suggested that this is not equivalent to creating 
systems that “rely substantively and uncritically on 
grand universal assumptions that are untestable by any 
empirical means” (Hartelius, 2017, p. 103, italics in 
original).  
 I agree with Hartelius that there are degrees 
of uncritical acceptance of assumptions and that 
some metaphysical systems may be more informed 
by these. In practice, however, science often does 
include grand theories and scientists are often prone to 
making metaphysical statements. Science is frequently 
underpinned by scientism—that is, the belief system 
of scientific materialism (Sheldrake, 2012). Materialist 
monism is surely a grand theory, insisting that matter 
is the primary reality, and including assumptions 
that consciousness is produced by the brain, and that 
evolution can be explained solely in terms of random 
mutations and natural selection. Whilst they are derived 
from some scientific findings, these are assumptions that 
cannot be tested or proven. How would it be possible 
to prove that consciousness is produced by the brain, 
or that consciousness ends with the death of the body? 
In other words, there is not necessarily evidence of false 
equivalence here.
 Frequently, adherents of materialist monism 
make metaphysical statements, while believing that 
they are speaking from a basis of scientific objectivity. 
One example of this is Francis Crick’s “astonishing 
hypothesis” that “You, your joys and your sorrows, 
your memories and your ambitions, your sense of 
personal identity and free will, are in fact no more 
than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and 
their associated molecules” (Crick, 1994, p. 3). The 
evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins has waxed 
metaphysical throughout his books—for example, when 
he has described human beings as “lumbering robots” 
and “survival machines,” nothing more than vehicles for 
genes whose “preservation is the ultimate rationale for 
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our existence” (Dawkins, 1976, p. 21). Another example 
is the psychologist Nicholas Humphrey’s assertion that 
“materialism is to all intents and purposes the fact of 
life” (1995, p. 54).
 I agree with Hartelius (2017) that, “Respect for 
the careful methods of science does not mean surrender 
to naïve materialism, or a physicalism that attempts to 
explain all phenomena in the stark terms of physics” (p. 
103). However, as the above quotes show, in practice such 
a surrender does often occur. 
Hartelius' Own Metaphysical Position
The above metaphysical statements from scientists illustrate how difficult it is to eschew metaphysics, 
and brings me  back to the subject of Hartelius’ own 
metaphysical position. When Hartelius has described 
participatory philosophy as suggesting, for example, 
that “consciousness in some form penetrates through 
all physicality” (Hartelius, 2015, p. 26), I would argue 
that this qualifies as a metaphysical statement. In fact, 
I would argue that it does not differ greatly from the 
description in Taylor (2016) of an all-pervading spiritual 
force. Other aspects of participatory philosophy’s 
view of the world, as described by Hartelius & Ferrer 
(2015)—for example, as a dynamic open-ended system 
with no duality between subject and object, and the 
human mind and the natural world being of the same 
nature—also probably qualify as metaphysical claims, 
by Hartelius' own criteria. (Perhaps Hartelius would 
suggest that these claims are not as substantively 
metaphysical as soft perennialism, but this is debatable.) 
 This relates to my point about the inevitability 
of holding some kind of interpretative metaphysical 
position in relation to mystical experiences. This is 
partly because mystical experiences often bring a 
powerful sense of revelation, a sense that one has made 
contact with a deeper level of reality, that necessitates 
interpretation of some form. In other words, such 
experiences inevitably give rise to questions about the 
nature of reality. As Marshall (2015) has pointed out, 
since one cannot escape some kind of metaphysical 
perspective towards mystical experiences, it is surely 
advisable to be explicit about this. Ferrer’s (2017) 
insistence on the undetermined nature of the mystery 
could be interpreted as a reluctance to disclose his 
own metaphysics, due to his view that transpersonal 
psychology should eschew metaphysics. In a similar 
way, Hartelius' metaphysical position is unclear. While 
his broader metaphysical outlook appears to conform 
to participatory philosophy, his attitude to mystical 
experiences shows signs of neuroscientific reductionism 
and contextualism (Marshall, 2015; Taylor, 2017a). 
 As stated in Taylor (2016, 2017a) my view is that 
there is no reason why one should refrain from making 
metaphysical claims, so long as these are secondary, 
explicitly stated, and are inferred or implied by 
phenomenological evidence, rather than being abstract 
or conceptual. In fact, in some senses, this may actually 
benefit the scientific enterprise, rather than hinder it. I 
will illustrate this point with an example from quantum 
physics. 
Logical Positivism and Quantum Physics 
In 1952, many of the world’s leading quantum physicists 
met in Copenhagen, to discuss the construction of a 
particle accelerator in Europe. There, an instructive 
conversation took place between Werner Heisenberg, 
Niels Bohr and Wolfgang Pauli, on the subject of 
metaphysics. Bohr had recently given a talk about 
quantum physics to a group of logical positivist 
philosophers, an experience he described as a “terrible 
disappointment” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 208). Although 
he endorsed the positivists’ emphasis on conceptual 
clarity, he remarked that “Their prohibition of any 
discussion of the wider issues, simply because we lack 
clear-cut enough concepts in this realm, does not seem 
very useful to me—this same ban would prevent you 
understanding of quantum theory” (Heisenberg, 1971, 
p. 208).
 Heisenberg voiced similar misgivings, 
commenting that: 
Positivists are extraordinarily prickly about all 
problems having what they call a prescientific 
character. I remember a book by Philipp Frank on 
causality, in which he dismisses a whole series of 
problems and formulations on the grounds that all of 
them are relics of the old metaphysics, vestiges from 
the period of prescientific or animistic thought…To 
him ‘metaphysic’ is a synonym for ‘loose thinking’ 
and hence a term of abuse (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 
208). 
Bohr had encountered Phillip Frank at this talk, and 
described him as using “the term metaphysics as a kind 
of swearword, or at best, as a euphemism for unscientific 
thought” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 209). (I think there are 
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some similarities with Hartelius’ attitude to metaphysics 
here.)
 Later the same day, Heisenberg and Wolfgang 
Pauli talked alone, and both agreed on the importance 
of examining obscure metaphysical areas where language 
and meaning were unclear. As Heisenberg remarked, 
“Where must we seek for the truth, in obscenity or in 
clarity? Niels has quoted Schiller's 'Truth dwells in the 
deeps.' Are there such deeps and is there any truth? And 
may these deeps perhaps hold the meaning of life and 
death?” (Heisenberg, 1971, p. 211). 
 It is interesting that these three eminent 
scientists believed that metaphysical ideas were an 
important part of the scientific enterprise, and freely 
explored them. More than sixty years ago, they were 
opposed to distinctions of the kind that Hartelius (2017) 
and also Friedman (2013) make between the unscientific 
and scientific, and believed that such a distinction 
would negate an understanding of quantum theory. In 
fact, in Taylor (2017a) I have suggested that Hartelius' 
(and Friedman’s) negative attitude to metaphysics is 
reminiscent of (although admittedly not as extreme as) 
logical positivist philosophy. I have also suggested that 
such an attitude may deprive transpersonal psychology 
of significant data—exactly as the three physicists above 
believed in relation to science in general. 
 Why should one be limited to what is commonly 
and immediately accessible to consciousness and 
disregard certain experiences or concepts simply because 
they are unfalsifiable? I do not think it is reasonable 
to deny theorists the right of making metaphysical 
speculations, as long as these are carefully justified, and 
with more research proposed to test the hypothesis. 
 To consider what is beyond the falsifiable does 
not mean that one immediately ceases to be a scientist. 
There is no clearly demarcated point where scientists 
suddenly become metaphysicians, simply because they 
have allowed themselves to ponder over the ontological 
implications of their findings. Surely science is not 
simply a matter of examining and collecting data, but 
also a matter of creating theories based on that data.
 It would be difficult to argue that Heisenberg, 
Pauli and Bohr were not valid scientists. This also applies 
to the large number of psychologists who considered 
metaphysical ideas, including William James, Jung, and 
transpersonal psychologists such as Maslow, Assagioli 
and Grof. According to Hartelius’ criteria (as applied to 
myself, Wilber and Blackstone) it would be more accurate 
to view these figures as spiritual teachers (and the creators 
of New Age religions) rather than psychologists.
Hierarchy 
Let me briefly respond to the criticism that Hartelius (2017) has made of the allegedly hierarchical nature of 
soft perennialism. This criticism was first raised by Ferrer 
(2002) in connection with traditional perennialism. 
This can be framed in terms of the distinction described 
earlier between esoteric and exoteric religion. Rightly 
in my view, Ferrer (2002) has suggested that Schuon 
(1984) and other perennialists privilege the esoteric over 
the exoteric, implying that the outward conventional 
forms of religion are a pale shadow of the mystical core, 
in which transcendent universals express themselves. Or, 
as Hartelius (2017) has framed this point in relation to 
soft perennialism, “One particular spiritual vision—
one out of the thousands that have been crafted—is the 
correct account of all of human spirituality, and explains 
all other versions as lesser or partially informed variants 
of its own vision. In this way perennialism is necessarily 
and intrinsically hierarchical—even soft perennialism” 
(p. xv, italics in original). 
 However, although it is easy to see how this 
criticism could apply to hard perennialists like Schuon 
(1975) and Huxley (1945), in my view, it is less relevant 
to soft perennialism, which allows for a great deal of 
diversity, and does not privilege any particular spiritual 
expression over any other. This is one of the ways in 
which it resembles Ferrer’s (2002, 2017) participatory 
philosophy. As noted in Taylor (2016), soft perennialism 
sees (in Hick’s, 1989, terminology) indigenous pre-
axial and post-axial spiritual traditions as equally valid. 
Soft perennialism allows for an immanent spirituality 
that expresses itself with equal validity in many diverse 
forms, none of which are higher or more valuable any 
other. 
 Ferrer (2017) has made a similar criticism 
in specific relation to the concept of an all-pervading 
spiritual force. He has suggested that soft perennialism 
privileges an essential spiritual force over metaphysical 
depictions of that force, thus creating a hierarchical 
framework. However, in my view, there is no reason why 
an interpretation or conception of spirit-force that is more 
laden with cultural and metaphysical constructs (such as 
a Christian or Jewish mystic’s concept of God) should 
be seen as less valuable than one that is apparently less 
constructed (such as the Lakota concept of wakan-tanka 
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or the Ainu of Japan’s concept of ramut). Here one could 
make an analogy with food. Certain foods may be eaten 
raw; in other meals, raw foods may be processed, cooked 
and combined in different ways. This does not mean that 
raw food is superior to cooked food. One could just as 
easily switch the hegemony around and suggest that the 
processed and cooked food is superior to the raw. Any 
hierarchical interpretation here is surely in the eye of the 
beholder.
False Equivalence
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Hartelius' (2017) response is the comparison of soft perennialism 
to intelligent design, creationism, and a New Age religion. 
In order to evaluate this argument further, let us return to 
Hartelius' (2017) view that I have used a postmodernist 
type of false equivalence to compare the metaphysics 
of science to those of religion, since in practice science 
is (according to Hartelius’ argument) less influenced 
by metaphysical ideas and assumptions. I believe that 
in comparing soft perennialism to intelligent design, 
Hartelius (2017) may be indulging in a similar notion 
of false equivalence. To claim that soft perennialism 
is similar to intelligent design because both are partly 
evidence-based, and both stem from an interpretation 
of evidence, could also be taken as an example of the 
application of the post-truth, postmodernist perspective. 
 There are obviously degrees and types of 
evidence, as Hartelius has pointed out, in the same 
way that there are degrees of metaphysical influence. 
Creationism is based on the wilful misinterpretation and 
fabrication of evidence, and to compare this to a theory 
derived from empirical evidence from a wide variety of 
sources and other scholars seems unjust. To compare soft 
perennialism to creationism does not take account of the 
various arguments for a perennial perspective made in 
Taylor (2016) and (2017)—for example, from the various 
studies using Hood’s M-Scale, studies into the after-
effects of near-death experiences, into the characteristics 
of post-traumatic growth, the conclusions of scholars 
such as Studshill (2005) and Rose (2016) based on their 
examinations of spiritual texts and reports of mystical 
experiences, evidence from my own research, and so 
on. Soft perennialism is not based on ideology, myth 
or tradition. Although provocative and speculative, it 
is not fabricated, but to some extent empirically based, 
and therefore not equivalent to creationism, or a new age 
religion. 
 Hartelius (2017) is right to caution against 
“highly selective readings of empirical evidence” (p. 82) 
and he is also right to distinguish between evidence for 
an experience, and the interpretation of that experience. 
But an interpretation can, of course, make a claim for 
validity if it is based on evidence, and is supported by 
multiple sources and studies—as I believe is the case 
with the soft perennialism model, and essentialism in 
general.
Conclusion
I fully understand that Hartelius has developed his own vision of transpersonal psychology that he is 
encouraging others to adopt. However, I believe that 
transpersonal psychology should be as inclusive as 
possible, and be open to multiple perspectives. I do not see 
why soft perennialism cannot coexist with Hartelius' own 
perspective, and multiple other perspectives. (After all, 
this pluralism is fully in accordance with the participatory 
philosophy that Hartelius has advocated.) It is surely 
healthy for such scholarly diversity to coexist within the 
same field.
 I also understand that Hartelius is keen to exclude 
metaphysical claims from transpersonal psychology so 
that the field may be taken more seriously by mainstream 
psychologists and scientists. Perhaps this would be the 
case, but one should be aware of the consequences of 
this. By limiting itself in the way that Hartelius (2017) 
and Friedman (2013) have recommended, transpersonal 
psychology would surely be turning away from the farther 
reaches of human nature, and disregarding a massive 
amount of potentially interesting and important data 
that lies there. Surely, as Heisenberg remarked above, 
these obscure areas should be explored. As the mystical 
scholar Evelyn Underhill (1932) wrote, “We may be 
sure that vast regions of existence lie beyond our sensory 
range; and that the world invisible includes grades and 
kinds of being of which we are unable to conceive” (p. 6). 
This recalls William James’ (1986) famous comment—
from which I have adapted the title of this essay—that 
“our normal waking consciousness…is but one special 
type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from 
it by the filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of 
consciousness entirely different…No account of the 
universe in its totality can be final which leaves these 
other forms of consciousness quite disregarded” (p. 388).
 I would suggest that a form of transpersonal 
psychology that includes metaphysical speculations (as 
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long as they are inferred by evidence and are not seen 
as central, and are explicitly stated) and that is open to 
perennial perspectives could fit very well within the 
context of the scientifically oriented, empirically-based 
form of transpersonal psychology that Hartelius has 
envisaged—and indeed, that it will actually enhance and 
extend the field in its diversity.
  Much to his credit, Hartelius (2017) encouraged 
further debate into these issues, and I look forward to 
responses from other transpersonal psychologists. 
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